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Abstract 
This paper discusses Gordon Baker’s interpretation of the later 
Wittgenstein, in particular his interpretation of the notion of 
Wittgensteinian philosophical conceptions (Auffassungen) and the 
notions of non-exclusivity, local incompatibility, non-additivity and 
global pluralism which Baker uses to characterize Wittgensteinian 
conceptions. On the basis of this discussion, and a critique of certain 
features of Baker’s interpretation of Wittgensteinian conceptions, I 
introduce the notion of a multidimensional logical description of 
language use, explaining how this notion, which Baker’s interpretation 
excludes, constitutes and important element of the later Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical method of clarification and perspicuous representation. 
I conclude by explaining how Baker’s problematic notions of local 
incompatibility and non-additivity, if they are seen in the light of 
Wittgenstein’s criticisms of certain views of the completeness of 
philosophical or logical accounts, nevertheless point in the right 
direction. 
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Introduction 
Many regard Gordon Baker as one of the most important 
contemporary Wittgenstein scholars. In the course of his career 
from the late 1970s until his untimely death in 2002, Baker first 
established his name by collaborating with Peter Hacker on their 
highly influential multi-volume Analytic Commentary. But in the late 
1980s, he came to question certain tenets of the Baker-Hacker 
interpretation, and moved on in new directions. His new thoughts 
on Wittgenstein found their first expression in his Wittgenstein, Frege 
and the Vienna Circle (1988), and in a number of subsequent articles 
in the 1990s, collected in the posthumous Wittgenstein’s Method: 
Neglected Aspects (2004, edited by Katherine Morris). Proceeding 
partly by way of a critique of the Baker-Hacker interpretation, in 
his later work, Baker developed a novel interpretation of the later 
Wittgenstein that now seems to have become, especially among a 
younger generation of Wittgenstein scholars, equally influential as 
the Baker-Hacker interpretation.1 While I am broadly sympathetic 
to Baker’s later reading of Wittgenstein, I will here present a 
critique of some aspects of his later account of Wittgensteinian 
philosophical conceptions. My critique serves the purpose of 
explaining the possibility of what I call “multidimensional logical 
descriptions” which is arguably a very important element of the 
later Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and his philosophy of 
logic, but which Baker’s later interpretation does not recognize, and 
whose possibility it seems to exclude. More specifically, the aims of 
this article can be explained as follows. 
In his paper “Grammar of Aspects and Aspects of Grammar”, 
completed posthumously by Katherine Morris, Baker discusses the 
concepts of aspect and conception (Auffassung) in Wittgenstein. By 
                                                          
1 For a brief account of their collaboration and a critique of Baker’s later views by his 
former co-author, who continues to defend and develop the Baker-Hacker interpretation, 
see Hacker 2007. Given the focus of this article on Baker’s later Wittgenstein-
interpretation, it is beyond its scope to discuss the relation between Baker’s later 
interpretation and that of Baker and Hacker or other similar readings, and the reasons for 
Baker’s rejection of the Baker-Hacker interpretation. For a detailed discussion and critique 
of the Baker-Hacker interpretation from a point of view largely in agreement with the 
later Baker, see Kuusela 2008. 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (No. 2) 2014 
  73 
a “conception” Baker means Wittgensteinian philosophical 
conceptions (such as his conception of meaning as use), and by an 
“aspect”, visual aspects in the sense discussed by Wittgenstein, for 
example, in the so-called second part of the Philosophical 
Investigations. 2  Baker makes related points about Wittgenstein’s 
notion of picture in another late paper, “Wittgenstein: Concepts or 
Conceptions”, the central claim of which is that the grammar of 
“conception” is analogous in certain ways with the grammar of 
“aspect”, i.e. that the uses of these words have important analogies. 
Baker then uses this analogy to characterize the notion of 
Wittgensteinian philosophical conceptions, how they differ from 
more traditional philosophical claims or theses, and how the 
analogy forms the basis of the description of certain difficulties of 
philosophizing, the understanding of which Wittgenstein’s notion 
of conception can further. For example, Baker makes a comparison 
between the way in which an entrenched philosophical conception 
may block other ways of thinking about an issue and how a 
person’s focus on one visual aspect may make her blind to other 
aspects (Baker 2004: 284). Overall, the notions of conception and 
aspect are of the highest importance for Baker’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s method. As he writes: “Revealing new aspects of 
what is perfectly familiar, developing new Auffassungen, is the general 
method of Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations.” (Baker 
2004: 290; cf. 33) 
I agree in many respects with Baker’s view of Wittgensteinian 
philosophical conceptions. In particular, I agree that it is part of the 
notion of such conceptions as well as Wittgensteinian philosophical 
pictures that they are non-exclusionary. That is, as Baker 
emphasizes, and as I will explain shortly in more detail, unlike 
traditional philosophical theses or claims understood as true/false 
statements, Wittgensteinian conceptions and pictures do not – 
automatically at least – exclude alternative conceptions. In this 
sense they exhibit a particular kind of plurality, as Baker explains. 
Nevertheless, Baker’s characterizations of certain features of the 
grammar of Wittgensteinian conceptions strike me as highly 
                                                          
2 Also known as Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment (see revised fourth edition). 
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problematic. My purpose here is to discuss those problems, and to 
bring out what seems correct and incorrect in Baker’s account of 
Wittgensteinian conceptions. Given the significance of the notion 
of conception for Baker’s Wittgenstein-interpretation, and the 
influence of his interpretation, this seems a worthwhile task already 
for these reasons. The examination of the notion of a conception is 
also, as Baker would be the first to emphasize, a task he did not 
himself complete. This is evident from one of his suggestions for 
topics deserving further investigation in the coda to “Concepts or 
Conceptions”, namely: “[…] the logic of pictures, especially their 
being heterogeneous, strictly purpose relative, and non-additive.” 
(Baker 2004, 277) Provided that Wittgenstein’s notions of picture 
and conception are interchangeable in most contexts – or so I 
maintain though I cannot argue it here – this article is a 
contribution to such a further investigation. It is in this capacity 
that I introduce the notion of multidimensional logical 
descriptions. This notion may be considered important for 
comprehending Wittgenstein’s notions of perspicuous 
representation and grammatical description.3 Let me begin with the 
points of agreement and by explaining Baker’s view of the non-
exclusiveness of Wittgensteinian conceptions. 
1. Baker on the grammar of “aspect” and “conception” 
The non-exclusionary character of Wittgensteinian philosophical 
conceptions can be explained as follows. A philosophical claim or 
thesis in a traditional sense purports to state something true about 
the identity or essence of the object of study. In so doing, the claim 
excludes other incompatible claims or theses as false. This is a basic 
point: two truth-claims that stand in conflict cannot both be 
accepted at the same time. In this way, theses about the identity or 
                                                          
3 There is an intimate connection between Wittgensteinian conceptions and his notion of 
perspicuous representation, if conceptions are understood as instruments whose purpose 
is the perspicuous representation of the uses of language. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to argue for this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of perspicuous 
representation, but such an argument, consistent with and informed by Baker’s work, is 
given in Kuusela 2008, Ch. 6.2. For Wittgenstein’s notion of picture, see Kuusela 2008: 
35-38, 41-43. 
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essence of something will exclude each other. By contrast, a 
Wittgensteinian picture or conception is meant to articulate a way 
of seeing or looking at reality (including language use); it constitutes 
a mode or form of representing or conceiving the object of 
investigation (Darstellungsweise or Betrachtungsweise). Importantly, 
because it is possible to see or look at something, to represent or 
conceive it in more than one way, Wittgensteinian conceptions are 
non-exclusionary: they do not exclude other conceptions in the way 
in which truth claims or theses do. Another way of putting this 
point is this: because a mode of representation is not true or false, 
it does not behave in the manner of true/false claims or of theses 
in relevant respects either, i.e. exclude other claims or theses. (Cf. 
Baker 2004: 266-268; Baker speaks of the non-facticity of pictures; 
266.) Wittgensteinian conceptions therefore differ importantly 
from philosophical theses understood as true/false claims.4 
Accordingly, a philosophical examination in Wittgenstein’s style, 
insofar as it consists in spelling out, scrutinizing, and employing 
conceptions and pictures for clarificatory purposes, differs from 
more traditional modes of philosophizing. At any rate, this is so to 
the extent that philosophizing traditionally consists in putting 
forward arguments in order to establish exclusionary theses and to 
refute competing theses. In this regard Baker describes traditional 
philosophical discourse as exemplified by analytic philosophy to be 
animated by an “ideal of philosophical argument as case building” 
and “the adversarial model of argument”, and philosophers as 
relishing “the clash of steel on steel” (Baker 2004: 269).5 However, 
even though philosophy in Wittgenstein’s mode does not aim to 
establish exclusionary philosophical truths, this does not mean that 
the tasks it sets itself are less important. As Baker puts it: “Choice 
                                                          
4  The notion of a conception is fluid, of course. Philosophers who understand their 
statements as claims or theses may speak of them as conceptions, and they have every 
right to do so. But it is important how we construe the notion of a conception or how we 
use it, i.e. whether we understand by it an articulation of a mode of representation or a 
true/false thesis or claim. 
5  Alternatively, in Wittgenstein’s case, one might speak of the clarificatory use of 
arguments, where the purpose is not to establish or reject theses but to elucidate 
conceptual connections and what the adherence to particular conceptions, pictures or 
accounts involves. For discussion, see Kuusela 2008: 244-247. 
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of a form of representation is answerable to no facts, but it is of 
decisive importance. It determines a whole intellectual orientation” 
(Baker 2004: 268; cf. PI §§569-570).6 
Baker’s view of the non-exlusionary character of 
Wittgensteinian conceptions is summarized in his notion of global 
pluralism: 
Global pluralism. […] no conception has exclusionary claim-rights; no-
one can claim his conception to be the only possibility. We can look at 
meaning in terms of the Augustinian picture; this does not exclude 
the possibility of our also looking at meaning as use (on another 
occasion) – or vice versa. To acknowledge one conception of meaning 
does not render illegitimate a different conception of it. Indeed, just as 
to speak of one visual aspect presupposes that there are others, so too, to 
speak of one conception presupposes that there are others. 
Conceptions, like aspects, are essentially plural. (Baker 2004: 283-284; 
my square brackets; original italics and bold.) 
In accordance with this characterization, Baker maintains (contrary 
to the Baker-Hacker interpretation) that the purpose of 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of, for example, the so-called Augustinian 
picture of language is not to refute Augustine’s view or to show 
that Augustine has misdescribed the use of the word “meaning” or 
“language” when suggesting that word-meaning is a matter of 
reference to objects. (According to Baker, pictures cannot be 
misdescriptions of grammar; Baker 2004: 267.) Rather, 
Wittgenstein is trying to do something more radical. Baker writes:  
[…] Augustine’s picture is primarily a form of representation, a way of 
seeing things, an intellectual orientation. […] Wittgenstein aims at 
nothing less than transforming an entrenched way of thinking, habits 
of thought […]. This is much more ambitious and radical than 
correcting a misdescription of the uses of words. (Baker 2004, 276) 
Consequently, we should expect Wittgenstein to  
                                                          
6 Arguably, it is an exaggeration to say that the choice of a form of representation is 
answerable to no facts (at all), but this issue cannot be discussed here and is not important 
for the present argument. See Kuusela 2013: 60-62 for discussion and example 1) in 
section 2 below. 
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[…] juxtapose against Augustine’s picture another picture, not a 
compendium for using ‘meaning’ or ‘language’ or an alternative 
‘theory’. (Baker 2004: 269)  
Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning as use, according to Baker, is 
therefore to be understood as a “counter-picture”, not as a more 
correct description of grammar that shows Augustine to be wrong, 
and excludes the Augustinian picture of meaning as reference. 
I think the preceding Bakerian points about Wittgenstein’s 
approach are both correct and very important. A reader familiar 
with the Baker-Hacker interpretation should easily be able to see 
how they constitute a departure from this interpretation: Rather 
than collecting “grammatical facts” or stating exclusionary 
“grammatical truths”, a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation 
spells out conceptions (pictures, modes of representation, ways of 
looking or conceiving of things) that are employed to render facts 
about language use perspicuous, or “to establish an order in our 
knowledge of the use of language” (PI §132). But this order, as 
Wittgenstein emphasizes, is “an order with a particular end in view; 
one out of many possible orders; not the order” (PI §132), i.e. it 
serves the solution of particular philosophical problems, without 
assuming that there should be anything like the right 
grammatical/logical order that contains in itself the solution to all 
philosophical problems.7 However, my agreement with Baker does 
not extend to certain further characteristics that he also ascribes to 
                                                          
7 See Kuusela 2008 for the justification of this interpretation of PI §132, and section 3 
below for further discussion. “Particular problems” here refers to actual philosophical 
problems which individuals or groups are concerned with in historical circumstances. 
Consequently, various psychological and/or sociological questions may also be raised 
about what it is to deal with the kind of problems to which Wittgenstein and Baker pay 
attention. As Baker observes, the resolution of such problems may require one to give up 
previously held conceptions or to change one’s “habits of thought” and “intellectual 
orientation”. Accordingly, as Wittgenstein puts it, not merely intellectual difficulties, but 
difficulties of the will may arise in dealing with philosophical problems (see, Ts213, 406-
407/PO, 161). Without wishing to pretend that the distinction between psychological and 
logical or grammatical considerations is easy to draw from the later Wittgenstein’s 
perspective (cf. PI §242 and Kuusela 2013a for discussion), my focus in the following is 
the logic or grammar of conceptions, not psychological issues. This corresponds to 
Baker’s aim to clarify the grammar of Wittgensteinian conceptions and pictures (see 
introduction and Baker 2004: 261, 266). Accordingly, the question whether 
Wittgensteinian conceptions are non-additive concerns the grammar of conceptions. 
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conceptions, namely what he calls their “local incompatibility” and 
“non-additivity”. Let us begin the discussion of these notions with 
how Baker explains them. He explains them first in relation to 
visual aspects: 
Local incompatibility [of visual aspects]. Aspects are transiently 
exclusionary; it is impossible to see a picture simultaneously as a duck 
and as a rabbit. Visual aspects are essentially non-additive: i.e. there is 
no such thing as combining two ways of seeing something to produce 
a single more comprehensive way of seeing it. Consequently, seeing 
something in one way interferes with seeing it differently. And an 
entrenched way of seeing may make it extremely difficult or practically 
impossible to see an unfamiliar aspect at all. (Baker 2004: 280-281; my 
square brackets.) 
This seems more or less acceptable, with certain reservations 
relating to the duck-rabbit example. Perhaps this example is not, 
due to its simplicity, quite as representative of the relevant sort of 
cases as one might think at first. Simple Gestalt-switch pictures, 
such as the duck-rabbit, are indeed normally seen in one way or the 
other, and in such a case the two ways of seeing cannot be 
combined into a single more comprehensive way of seeing the 
figure. In short, what the figure represents is identified as either a 
duck or a rabbit, and these visual identifications exclude each 
other.8 It is notable, however, that in the case of the duck-rabbit 
both ways of seeing neatly accommodate all (or almost all) features 
of the figure, because of its simplicity. My reservation against 
Baker’s example then is that it may not be so representative after 
all. It might be possible in the case of more complex visual objects, 
especially if all their features are not perfectly accommodated by 
the different ways of seeing them, to see the object simultaneously 
in different ways. If neither of the two ways of seeing such an 
object neatly accommodates all the object’s features, this may 
weaken the tendency to settle on one of the ways of seeing it. Thus, 
                                                          
8 This exclusion is not merely psychological but logical or grammatical in that there is no 
creature that the duck-rabbit picture represents of which we would have a more 
comprehensive view, if we combine its characteristic of duckness with its rabbitness, so to 
speak. One can of course also see the figure as a Gestalt-switch picture of a duck-rabbit, 
but then it is not seen as either simply a duck or a rabbit, and this way of looking is not 
more comprehensive in that sense, but a third different way of seeing the picture. 
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it is not unproblematic to compare philosophical clarification with 
looking at simple Gestalt-switch pictures. In the case of a 
philosophical attempt to comprehend a highly complex 
phenomenon, it may well be that none of the ways of seeing or 
conceiving available perfectly accommodates all the features of the 
case. (See examples in section 3.) 
Regardless of how things are with visual aspects (a case which is 
not particularly important for my discussion), arguably, Baker is 
wrong to take the grammars of “aspect” and “conception” to be 
analogous with respect to local incompatibility. Instead, there is an 
extremely important disanalogy between the grammars of the two 
notions, and in fact the claim that conceptions are locally 
incompatible fits very poorly with what Wittgenstein says, for 
example, about the concepts of language, meaning and 
mathematics.9 Here is how Baker characterizes the local incompa-
tibility of conceptions: 
Local incompatibility [of conceptions]. Like visual aspects, conceptions 
are transiently exclusionary; it is impossible to see thinking 
simultaneously as an inner accompaniment to speaking and as operating 
with signs (cf. BB, 7ff.). Conceptions too are essentially non-additive: 
attempting to combine them produces, not a more comprehensive 
way of looking at a concept, but muddle. (Baker 2004: 284)10 
Exactly how we should understand what Baker says about local 
incompatibility depends, naturally, on what he means by “non-
additive” and “comprehensive”. Given that he does not explain 
these notions, I take them in what I understand to be their usual 
meaning: an account is comprehensive when it does not leave out 
something relevant. On that reading they strike me as highly 
problematic. As I will explain, it is not the case that conceptions are 
                                                          
9 I will shortly discuss these examples in more detail. But to emphasize, this is a general 
problem with Baker’s interpretational claim about local incompatibility, not specific to the 
examples to be discussed. I have chosen these examples because of their importance for 
Wittgenstein. If Baker’s interpretation cannot accommodate them, it may be regarded as 
generally problematic as an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s method. 
10 Baker continues by saying: the interference of conceptions has “enormously important 
consequences in philosophy.” “[…] when a philosophical conception becomes 
entrenched it affects the whole conduct of one’s philosophical investigation.” (Baker 
2004: 284) This again seems to be perfectly in order. 
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“essentially non-additive” and that “attempting to combine them 
produces, not a more comprehensive way of looking at a concept, 
but muddle”, contrary to what Baker says. Non-additivity and 
impossibility to combine, in other words, are not part of the 
grammar or logic of Wittgensteinian conceptions. Rather, it may be 
crucial for our philosophical understanding of a concept or for the 
grammatical description or perspicuous representation of uses of 
language to employ different conceptions to capture different 
aspects of the use of expressions simultaneously. Wittgensteinian 
conceptions allow us to do just this.11 In such a case it is then 
perfectly unobjectionable to say that we have a more 
comprehensive conception, account or understanding than we 
would have on the basis of a single conception. Combining 
Wittgensteinian conceptions, in other words, need not create any 
muddles. Instead, if one holds on to a simplistic account that does 
not capture all aspects of the object of investigation that are 
relevant for dealing with the philosophical problems at hand, one 
risks getting stuck in muddles and with philosophical problems 
thus generated. (In Wittgenstein interpretation a typical way of 
ending up holding such a simplistic view is to assume that 
Wittgensteinian philosophical conceptions play the role of 
philosophical theses or claims, i.e. to take them to be exclusionary 
and therefore not possible to combine. See notes 13 and 14.) The 
best way to explain this is by means of examples from 
Wittgenstein. 
2. Combining conceptions: examples from Wittgenstein 
In this section I discuss three examples from Wittgenstein in order 
to show that it is indeed part of his method to combine different 
                                                          
11 I will assume (in accordance with what I take to be Baker’s view) that the criterion of 
correctness for a philosophical account is its ability to solve particular philosophical 
problems. The criterion is not, so to speak, correspondence with “grammatical facts”. A 
natural way to read the point of PI §132 about there being many possible ways to order 
our knowledge of language is to take it as rejecting the notion of “grammatical facts”. 
(There are only empirical facts to be found out about language, and their relevance to 
philosophy is less direct than the relevance of any putative “grammatical facts” would be.) 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (No. 2) 2014 
  81 
conceptions with the purpose of clarifying or perspicuously 
representing complex concepts or uses of language. 
1) The arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness of grammar. Wittgenstein 
makes the following remark about the grammar of the word 
“language” in the Investigations: 
To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for a 
particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently 
with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which 
we speak of the invention of a game. 
 Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word 
“language”, by connecting it with the grammar of the word “invent”. 
(PI §492) 
This remark compares the invention of a language with the 
invention of an instrument on the one hand, and with the 
invention of a game on the other hand. Its point can be explained 
as follows. To invent an instrument is to invent something that 
enables one to achieve some pre-existing goal. For example, a 
spade makes digging holes more effective than doing it with bare 
hands, and a digger makes digging holes even more effective. Here 
the goal that these instruments enable us to reach more effectively 
is comprehensible quite independently of our familiarity with the 
instruments. In this sense it is usually not the case that the purpose 
that the instrument serves becomes comprehensible only through 
the design or construction of the instrument itself. Here lies an 
important difference to the design of concepts. For in the case of a 
concept we typically are not familiar with the classification that the 
concept makes, i.e. the purpose it serves, independently of our 
familiarity with the concept itself.12 In the latter kind of case there 
is then no pre-existing goal which the concept serves, a goal given 
independently of the design of the concept, and a concept is not an 
instrument for achieving a pre-existing goal. Similarly, when one 
invents a game, what the rules of the game should be is not 
determined by any pre-existing goals in the same way as the design 
of an instrument for a particular purpose. Of course the invention 
of a game may serve some pre-existing goals, for example, of 
                                                          
12 This is a basic anti-empiricist point. 
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making the inventor rich and/or being entertaining. Such goals, 
however, do not yet suffice to fix the rules of the game. Many 
different kinds of games can be entertaining and make their 
inventor rich. Thus, the rules of a game are in a certain sense 
arbitrary, unlike the principles by which the design of an instrument 
for digging should be governed. As is well known, Wittgenstein 
speaks of the rules of language as arbitrary in a sense comparable to 
the rules of a game. The design of language is not answerable to or 
justifiable with reference to external goals such as, for example, 
communication or true representation of reality, as if we had a 
criterion for the correct representation of reality independently of 
the concepts by means of which we represent it. But Wittgenstein 
also acknowledges that the invention of a language can be similar 
to the invention of an instrument. Here the rules of a language are 
not arbitrary, but serve some pre-existing goal. (PG, 184-188, 192; 
see Kuusela 2008: 163ff for discussion.) 
What the comparison of the invention of a language with the 
invention of instruments and games brings to view, therefore, is 
two different aspects of the concept of language: a sense in which 
its rules may be arbitrary and a sense in which they may be non-
arbitrary. Both these aspects may be important for a clear 
philosophical understanding of the concept of language in that 
envisaging language under one aspect only may lead to forcing 
particular cases of language use into a mould in which they do not 
fit, and overall constitutes a simplistic conception of language. 
Equipped with such a simplistic conception one may then remain 
unable to resolve philosophical problems whose resolution requires 
the recognition of other aspects too. 
Notably, although there may be cases that exhibit one or the 
other feature in something like a pure form – for example, 
stipulative definitions exhibit the feature of arbitrariness – there are 
cases that exhibit both features, according to Wittgenstein. An 
example of the latter is our system of colour-concepts of which he 
says: “[…] is there something arbitrary about this system? Yes and 
no. It is akin both to what is arbitrary and to what is non-arbitrary.” 
(Z §358) In such a case it would not be correct to say either that 
the use of language is or is not governed by arbitrary rules (as if 
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stating a truth). Both claims alone state something false or 
constitute a simplistic way of understanding this case. For example, 
it would be incorrect to say that the exclusion of reddish green is a 
matter of arbitrary convention or a matter of our habituation to a 
certain arbitrary conceptual system. At any rate, Wittgenstein is 
explicit that this is not a view he wishes to hold (Z §355). Rather, to 
account for such a case we need to see the ways in which it exhibits 
both the feature of arbitrariness, i.e. exemplifies exceptionless 
conceptual necessity which is not merely a matter of factual 
generality, as well as exhibiting the feature of non-arbitrariness, i.e. 
reflects empirical facts and is conditioned by them.13 
The case of the arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness of grammar 
provides us with an example in which the simultaneous use of 
different conceptions or pictures may be required for a perspicuous 
view or representation of the concept (i.e. that of language), and 
where a one-sided conception may give rise to philosophical 
problems. (Taking both aspects into account might not be 
important in the case of every philosophical problem about the 
concept of language, but as Wittgenstein’s view of colour concepts 
exemplifies, it is in some cases.) Such simultaneous use of 
conceptions, however, is excluded by Baker’s view of the non-
additivity of philosophical conceptions. In denying the possibility 
of combining conceptions, Baker’s interpretation of 
Wittgensteinian conceptions as non-additive is in conflict with what 
Wittgenstein says about the arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness of 
the grammar of language. In cases such as colour concepts it may 
be necessary to combine the conception of the arbitrariness and 
non-arbitrariness of grammar in order to describe or achieve a 
perspicuous view of their function. Rather than being bound to 
result in a muddle, such a combination gives us a more 
                                                          
13  By contrast, in volume 2 of their Analytic Commentary Baker and Hacker defend a 
conventionalist interpretation of Wittgenstein, maintaining that the essence of colours is a 
grammatical construction. They write: “[…] it is our rules for the use of colour-words 
which create what we call ‘the nature (the essence) of colour.’” (Baker and Hacker 1985: 
331) Arguably, however, this view is both philosophically and interpretationally 
problematic. For critique and an alternative interpretation, see Kuusela 2008, Ch. 5. 
Oskari Kuusela  BY-NC-SA 
 84 
comprehensive view of the concepts than either conception alone 
could do, contrary to what Baker holds.  
2) Meaning. To regard word-meaning as constituted by rules for 
the use of a word, as Wittgenstein proposes to do, is to regard the 
sound of a word as irrelevant to its meaning. According to this 
account, only the rules by which the sign is governed are relevant 
for the determination of meaning, and signs themselves – their 
sound and shape – are entirely arbitrary. From the point of view of 
this conception, to regard sound as relevant for meaning would be 
– as Wittgenstein jokes – like painting terrifying eyes on the chess 
queen in order to win a match (cf. AWL, 104). This conception, 
however, gives a simplistic picture of the concept of meaning 
overall, in that it cannot account, for example, for onomatopoeic 
words, where sound is relevant to meaning. As Wittgenstein notes 
elsewhere: “In the case of an onomatopoeic word the sound 
belongs to the symbol” (Ms109, 109; Ts211, 388). Sound, and 
likewise orthographic appearance and layout, can be relevant for 
example for meaning in the case of poetry (cf. PI §§528-532). 
Consequently, in order to avoid unjustly excluding sound-based 
cases from the class of the phenomena of linguistic meaning, to 
achieve a perspicuous view of the concept of meaning, and to 
resolve philosophical problems arising from a simplistic account of 
linguistic meaning, we may again need to employ more than one 
philosophical conception simultaneously in order to capture the 
different aspects of the concept. In the case of onomatopoeic 
words Wittgenstein suggests this kind of an alternative and 
complementary conception of meaning by proposing a comparison 
of onomatopoeic words with colour samples. (Ms141, 3; cf. BB, 
84-85) Onomatopoeic words are similar to colour samples, and 
differ from words whose meaning is conventional, in that samples 
and onomatopoeic words are compared with reality for similarity. 
By contrast, in the case of words whose meaning is determined by 
conventions, such comparisons make no sense. The Finnish word 
“tuoli” is neither more nor less similar to chairs than the Italian 
word “sedia”. 
Moreover, as in the preceding example of colour concepts, here 
too it may be important for understanding a particular case that we 
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see it simultaneously under both aspects, i.e. as exhibiting features 
captured by the different conceptions of meaning, or explain its 
meaning as constituted simultaneously in different ways. This is 
exemplified by the word “pipsqueak” (informal, “an insignificant or 
contemptible person”, OED), which has a certain iconic 
dimension, so to speak, that indicates a reference to a small-sized 
creature that makes peep-squeak noises. The word could not be 
replaced by some other arbitrary sign used according to the same 
rules without a loss in meaning. Its meaning seems to be 
determined by both rules and sound. And again, it would seem 
wholly fitting and correct to characterize an account of meaning 
that combines more than one conception as being more 
comprehensive than can be given in terms of a single conception. 
If so, conceptions can here be used in an additive way without this 
resulting in a muddle, pace Baker. Hence, Baker’s interpretation of 
the grammar of “conception” also turns out to be problematic in 
the light of Wittgenstein’s remarks on meaning. 
3) Mathematics. My final example pertains to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of mathematics. On the one hand, Wittgenstein 
characterizes mathematical propositions as rules of grammar that 
are arbitrary in that they are not derivable from empirical reality 
and do not correspond to or describe any mathematical reality 
either, such as the Platonists postulate. On the other hand, he also 
maintains that it is essential for mathematics to have an application 
to reality. As Wittgenstein explains the point by means of a 
comparison with the dual role of a king: 
A rule qua rule is detached, it stands as it were alone in its glory; 
although what gives it importance is the facts of daily experience. 
 What I have to do is something like describing the office of a 
king;—in doing which I must never fall into the error of explaining 
the kingly dignity by the king’s usefulness, but I must leave neither his 
usefulness nor his dignity out of account. (Ms124, 13, 14/RFM, 357) 
The remark distinguishes between two aspects of the role or use of 
a mathematical rule or principle. On the one hand, Wittgenstein 
compares the non-derivability of a mathematical principle from 
empirical reality with the dignity of a king. Like a king, such a 
principle stands “alone in its glory”. It is detached from contingent 
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reality in the sense of being untouched by how things happen to be 
in the empirical world, as if above all happenstance. On the other 
hand, he compares the practical applications of mathematical 
principles to represent empirical reality with the usefulness of a 
king. As Wittgenstein notes, it is such applications that give 
mathematics its importance, i.e., they make mathematics more than 
a mere game with signs. Significantly, as the remark shows, 
Wittgenstein sees it as crucial to his task of clarification or 
perspicuous representation to avoid any reduction of either of the 
aspects of mathematics to the other. The error he must not fall 
into, he says, is trying to explain one aspect in terms of the other. 
Instead, these different aspects are to be accounted for and 
characterized in their own right so as to avoid giving a misleadingly 
simple account of mathematics. This brings clearly into view the 
non-reductive character of Wittgensteinian conceptions. 
Evidently, Wittgenstein would regard his account of 
mathematics as incomplete and potentially misleading, if it left out 
either one of the two aspects of mathematics. Again it might not 
always be necessary to take into account both aspects when 
discussing philosophical problems relating to mathematics. But 
both the conception of mathematical rules as arbitrary and of 
mathematics as having an application to reality are potentially 
relevant for the resolution of philosophical problems relating to 
mathematics, and accordingly, the possibility of employing these 
conceptions simultaneously is crucial for Wittgenstein’s method. 
Pace Baker, it is therefore not only possible to combine the two 
Wittgensteinian conceptions. Combining them may be necessary in 
the context of the discussion of certain philosophical problems 
relating to the concept of mathematics, and for the perspicuous 
representation of the concept of mathematics. Thus, Baker is 
wrong to claim that combining the two conceptions inevitably 
creates a muddle. Instead, philosophical problems may result from 
a failure to combine them. 
Overall, the preceding examples leave little doubt that, contrary 
to Baker’s account of the grammar of Wittgensteinian conceptions, 
it is possible to combine different conceptions into more 
comprehensive accounts. This possibility of combining 
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conceptions constitutes a very important feature of Wittgenstein’s 
method of grammatical description and perspicuous representation. 
We may speak of this possibility of characterizing concepts or 
modes of language use simultaneously in terms of different 
conceptions as the possibility of multidimensional descriptions of language 
use. Insofar as it is the business of grammar or logic to describe the 
uses of language in order to clarify them, as Wittgenstein maintains 
(cf. PI §§108-109, OC §§56, 82, 628), we may speak of 
multidimensional logical or grammatical descriptions. Such a description 
represents a concept or a mode of language use at the same time 
under different aspects by means of different Wittgensteinian 
conceptions, as illustrated by Wittgenstein’s characterization of 
language by means of the conceptions of the arbitrariness and non-
arbitrariness of grammar. Here it is important to note that were 
these conceptions put forward as philosophical theses about the 
nature of language, i.e., that it is of the nature of language that its 
grammar is either arbitrary or non-arbitrary, they would exclude 
one another, and could not be combined into a multidimensional 
description.14 In this sense the non-exclusivity of Wittgensteinian 
conceptions is crucial for multidimensional descriptions. (I will 
return to this point shortly.) Although Baker is therefore correct to 
emphasize the non-exclusivity of conceptions, he falls into error in 
maintaining that Wittgensteinian conceptions are non-additive. 
In effect, one might say, Baker’s conception of the non-
additivity of conceptions constitutes a relapse into the traditional 
view of philosophy as putting forward exclusionary theses. Just like 
traditional true/false philosophical theses, so too non-additive 
conceptions are mutually exclusive and cannot be combined into 
more comprehensive accounts when used to discuss particular 
philosophical problems. But if resolving particular philosophical 
problems or the perspicuous representation of language use may 
sometimes require the simultaneous employment of different 
Wittgensteinian conceptions, Baker’s interpretation fails to account 
for a crucial feature of Wittgenstein’s method. Importantly, as 
                                                          
14 For a discussion of difficulties that arise for such reasons for Hacker’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s view of meaning and language, see Kuusela 2008: 168ff. 
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explained in section 1 and quotes therein, Baker does allow for the 
non-exclusionary use of conceptions “globally”, i.e. when different 
conceptions are used on different occasions to address different 
philosophical problems. However, global plurality in this sense 
cannot solve the problem with Baker’s Wittgenstein-interpretation. 
This is my theme for the following section. 
3. How Baker’s notions of locality and non-additivity still 
point in the right direction 
As noted, the possibility of combining philosophical conceptions 
into multidimensional descriptions assumes their non-exclusivity. 
By contrast, philosophical conceptions understood as true/false 
claims (theses or theories) cannot be combined in this way, and in 
this sense the method of the employment of Wittgensteinian 
philosophical conceptions opens up new – as far as I am aware, 
unprecedented – possibilities for philosophy. A way to describe this 
is to say that Wittgenstein’s account of the role of philosophical 
conceptions makes possible an increase in the flexibility of 
philosophical thought, but without a loss in its rigour. Flexibility is 
increased because there is now no need to try to explain all cases 
that fall under a particular concept in terms of one overarching 
definition, or to explain them in terms of a single exclusive 
philosophical theory or conception. Instead, as the examples in 
section 2 illustrate, Wittgensteinian conceptions enable us to give 
more complex accounts of complex concepts or phenomena. 
Nevertheless, rigour in the sense of the employment of clear and 
precise characterizations or definitions of concepts or phenomena 
– or of their specific aspects, or of sub-classes of cases falling under 
concepts – is retained in that such characterizations, understood as 
playing the role of Wittgensteinian conceptions, enable us be clear 
about what exactly we are saying in the context of particular 
philosophical discussions. Crucially, rigour only requires that we 
stick to clear and precise characterizations, definitions or 
conceptions of concepts in the context of particular discussions. 
This puts us in a position to know at any point what is meant by 
particular concepts in that discussion, and we can avoid switching 
unnoticed between different meanings of our terms, keep track of 
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our inferences, and so on. By contrast, rigour does not require that 
we use a term according to one and the same definition in every 
philosophical discussion, or that there should be one exclusively 
correct philosophical definition of a concept.15 
As for understanding what misled Baker to make the 
problematic claim that conceptions are non-additive, a possible 
explanation would be to say that he was misled by a partial analogy 
between the grammar of the words “aspect” and “conception” to 
maintain that the analogy holds even where it no longer holds. For 
both visual aspects and conceptions are non-exclusive in the sense 
that seeing something under one aspect does not exclude the 
possibility of seeing it under another, and in this same way one way 
of looking does not exclude the possibility of another way. 
However, although it may be true that visual aspects are non-
additive, at least in the case of simple Gestalt-switch pictures (see 
section 1), this is not true of Wittgensteinian philosophical 
conceptions, as I have argued. It could, therefore, have been the 
visual terms of “looking at something”, “seeing something as 
something”, and “seeing something under an aspect”, which also 
have an application in non-visual cases, that misled Baker. 
However, this explanation is ultimately philosophically 
uninteresting in that it merely describes Baker as having fallen into 
confusion, rather than helping us to understand his thinking and 
what he was trying to get at in his Wittgenstein-interpretation. I will 
next outline a philosophically more interesting explanation of 
Baker’s mistake that aims to clarify how his notions of the non-
additivity of conceptions and, as one might call it, “the locus-
specificity of philosophical clarifications”, which the notions of 
local incompatibility and global pluralism assume, point in the right 
direction. Perhaps this is what Baker had in view. 
Let us start by examining more closely Baker’s contrast between 
local and global philosophical considerations or the locality vs. 
globality of such considerations. As I understand it, the contrast 
can be outlined as follows. A local consideration is relative to some 
particular philosophical problem that an individual or individuals 
                                                          
15 For a discussion of the notion of rigour, see Kuusela 2013a. 
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have. In line with Baker’s notion of global pluralism, we might then 
use a particular philosophical conception locally in dealing with 
such a particular philosophical problem, while at another occasion 
or locus, i.e. when dealing with a different problem relating to the 
same concept or concepts, we might use a different conception. 
Here different loci refer to different contexts of philosophical 
discussion, specified with reference to particular individual 
problems. On this reading, Baker’s notion of global plurality of 
conceptions refers to the possibility of employing different 
conceptions locally in the context of discussions of different 
philosophical problems. Here is one more quote from Baker that 
explains his distinction with reference both to the notions of 
picture and conception: 
[…] pictures are globally complementary, not exclusionary. One way 
of seeing things (Auffassung) does not exclude the possibility of others. 
It is rational to make use of different pictures of a single phenomenon 
for the purpose of bringing out different patterns or aspects of what is 
investigated for the purpose of treating different conceptual confusions (compare 
§132). (Baker 2004: 268; second italics mine.) 
Let us call the view expressed here that different conceptions can 
be employed globally, but only for the purpose of treating different 
conceptual confusions, “strict locality”. On this view, conceptions 
are globally complementary and pluralistic in that more than one 
conception can be used to characterize a concept when responding 
to different conceptual confusions or philosophical problems 
relating to a concept. I agree that Wittgensteinian philosophical 
conceptions and pictures are globally plural in Baker’s sense. As I 
will explain, they are also locus-specific. Arguably, however, they 
are not locus-specific in the sense of strict locality that would imply 
and support Bakerian local incompatibility. 
The problem with Baker’s account, more specifically, is the 
following. In essence, his contrast between local and global 
considerations, insofar as it is to entail local incompatibility and 
global pluralism, is too simple in that it assumes an oversimplified 
conception of the clear identifiability of philosophical problems 
and their neat separability from one another. If philosophical 
problems were clearly identifiable and neatly separable from one 
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another, then Baker’s local-global contrast might hold in a strict 
sense required for local incompatibility. There would then be, on 
the one hand, strictly locally employed conceptions whose purpose 
is to resolve specific problems. On the other hand, there would be 
a global level of philosophical considerations at which different 
conceptions could be employed in order to resolve different local 
problems relating to a concept, without assuming that these 
conceptions should fit together so as to constitute a systematic 
overall account of that concept. However, it does not seem true 
that philosophical problems are neatly identifiable and separable in 
a sense required for Baker’s strict separation of local and global 
levels of philosophical examination. If this is correct, it has certain 
important consequences for Baker’s account.16 
That philosophical problems are not neatly separable certainly 
appears to be Wittgenstein’s view. Rather than encountered one by 
one, philosophical problems come in groups of many 
interconnected problems. And just this is, Wittgenstein says, what 
makes them so very hard to resolve: solid ground is nowhere to be 
found but everywhere we look we encounter confusions. He 
comments on this issue in the context of a discussion of issues 
relating to the concept of pain: 
It is a comparison that misleads us. 
 Or actually, a hundred misleading comparisons seem to meet here: 
one takes for an ostensive definition what is not one; & for a 
                                                          
16  A further problem with Baker’s view is this: Even if we could maintain the neat 
separability and identifiability of philosophical problems, an additional argument would be 
needed to support Baker’s claim that Wittgensteinian conceptions are generally or always 
locally incompatible. For insofar as combining different conceptions can only ever lead to 
a muddle in Baker’s view, local incompatibility seems to assume that some single 
philosophical conception always suffices to resolve an individual philosophical problem (if 
there’s to be a solution to it at all). But it is hard to see how an argument could run to 
establish this claim about the resolution of philosophical problems. Moreover, as I have 
argued, combining different Wittgensteinian conceptions may be necessary for avoiding 
simplistic accounts of concepts and consequent philosophical problems. Hence, it is 
questionable on these grounds too that we could assume strict local incompatibility. 
Notably, it is a different matter altogether that sometimes in individual cases different 
conceptions are not combinable or are non-additive. Arguably, whenever this occurs it 
has to do with the specific content of the relevant conceptions. For example, the 
conceptions of thinking as operating with signs and as an accompaniment to speaking 
mentioned by Baker seem incompatible in this sense. 
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description what is not a description; & for a name what is not a 
name; and for knowing something that is not knowing. […] 
 A hundred misleading pictures meet here & that is what makes up 
the difficulty of the philosophical condition. […] The “great” difficult 
problems of philosophy are not that because here we have an 
extraordinarily subtle and mysterious fact to investigate, but because a 
great many misleading forms of expression meet at this point. (Ms116, 
216–218; see also Ms120, 39v) 
Another remark on the same theme says:  
In philosophy one question is solved by posing a hundred others//by 
connecting it with//adding a hundred others. (Ms121, 59v) 
Now, if philosophical problems are constituted by interconnected 
confusions in the sense just outlined, it seems very difficult or 
impossible to separate such problems neatly from one another for 
local treatment individually or one by one in the sense of Bakerian 
strict locality. For example, if what we might abstractly think of as 
the philosophical problem about the nature of pain or sensations 
arises because we are confused about a variety of concepts 
connected with the concept of pain or sensations, then to deal with 
this problem is not to deal with a separable local problem about 
pain. Instead of having one problem in our hands, we have a 
hundred problems, as Wittgenstein says, or a network of 
interconnected problems, which make up the problem about pain 
or sensations. However, if this kind of connectedness is 
characteristic of philosophical problems more generally, as 
Wittgenstein suggests in the last paragraph of the longer quote, 
then there is no Bakerian strictly local level of philosophical 
considerations to begin with (that are relative to different individual 
problems), and it is unclear whether a situation could ever arise in 
which the principle of local incompatibility would apply. 
Furthermore, it certainly seems possible that those one hundred 
confusions that according to Wittgenstein make up the problem 
about pain might be connected with different aspects of the 
concept of pain – for example, with different issues relating to how 
pain appears from the first and third person perspectives. If so, 
different conceptions may need to be employed simultaneously to 
resolve the problem about pain, and to achieve an overview of the 
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concept that renders it clear. What is needed, that is to say, may be 
multidimensional logical or grammatical descriptions in the sense 
introduced earlier. To put the point differently, Wittgenstein 
emphasizes that the difficulty of philosophical problems is due to 
their connectedness: solving one problem requires solving many. 
But if so, solving one problem may require the simultaneous use of 
many conceptions to characterize different aspects of the 
problematic concept. Or to explain the point in a yet different way, 
it might not always be clear whether we are speaking of one or 
many problems in a particular context, because problems might not 
be neatly separable and identifiable. But if this is not always clear, 
then strict locality cannot be required of Wittgensteinian 
conceptions either. The difference between local and global levels 
of philosophical considerations is not clear-cut enough to sustain 
the principle of local incompatibility.17 
Nevertheless, even if Baker’s view of local incompatibility as a 
general characteristic of Wittgensteinian conceptions dissolves in 
this way, there is still something correct in his notion of non-
additivity, and his contrast between locally employed conceptions 
and philosophical accounts that aim at comprehensiveness. That is, 
although it is not true that combining philosophical conceptions 
must result in muddle, or that Wittgensteinian conceptions cannot 
be combined to create more comprehensive accounts, Wittgenstein 
is undoubtedly critical of certain views about what it is to strive for 
comprehensiveness or completeness in philosophy. To the extent 
that Baker’s notion of non-additivity can be understood in the light 
of Wittgenstein’s critical points about comprehensiveness and 
                                                          
17 There is a possible Bakerian response, connected with his emphasis of the conception 
of philosophy as therapy, to the problem about the identification and separation of 
philosophical problems, that is: could philosophical problems not be identified with 
reference to the person who is suffering from them? This does not work for two reasons. 
Firstly, even if we accept (as I think we should) that there can be (and often is) variation 
between persons with respect to what exactly they find problematic in some philosophical 
issue (so that there are not stock philosophical answers, clarifications or solutions that can 
be assumed to work for everyone), there seems to be no reason why the same 
philosophical problems could not be shared by more than one person. If so, identification 
of problems with reference to persons fails. Secondly, the problem regarding the neat 
identification and separability of philosophical problems that I have raised also arises at a 
personal level. Thus, moving to this level does not help. 
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completeness, it seems to be pointing in the right direction. I will 
conclude the article by explaining this. 
What does Wittgenstein say about comprehensiveness and 
completeness? An aspect of what Wittgenstein critically 
characterizes as the sublimation of logic is the view that there 
should be something like a complete grammar for the use of an 
expression that would provide us with rules that cover all occasions 
of its use, and in this sense give us a complete description of the 
expression’s possible uses. More specifically, because it is not 
possible to give such a complete description by enumeration due to 
the potentially infinite number of possible uses, it is part of this 
notion of a complete grammar that it should be possible to give it 
in advance of a word’s employments in particular cases, and in this 
sense, as Wittgenstein puts it, independently of any future 
experience. (Ms142, 88, 100; Ms152, 95; Ts220, 75; cf. PI §92.) 
However, although Wittgenstein assumed the possibility of this 
kind of completeness in the Tractatus, where it informs the notion 
of complete analysis, he rejects it later (Ms116, 80-81/PG, 211). As 
he puts the point in his lectures: “We might feel that a complete 
logical analysis would give the complete grammar of a word. But 
there is no such thing as a completed grammar. However, giving a 
rule has a use if someone makes an opposite rule which we do not 
wish to follow.” (AWL, 21) In the Investigations he writes: “We don’t 
want to refine or complete the system of rules for our words in 
unheard-of ways. […]” (PI §133)18 
Wittgenstein’s point can be explained as follows. The reason to 
reject the outlined notion of the completeness of analyses or 
philosophical accounts is that there is no criterion of completeness 
in the assumed abstract sense, whereby an analysis or account is 
complete insofar as it can resolve any possible unclarity whatsoever 
relating to a concept or a phenomenon, or any confusion that 
might arise or be imagined about the relevant issue. This, 
Wittgenstein explains, is an illusory ideal notion of completeness 
                                                          
18 A more precise reading/translation suggested by earlier drafts of this remark would be: 
“We don’t want to refine in unheard-of ways or complete…” Here “complete” specifies 
what kind of refinement out of all possible kinds of refinements would be at stake, i.e. 
refinement as completion. 
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that cannot be met, because no determinate sense has been given 
to what we should understand by the totality of all possible 
unclarities. No determinate sense has been given to this notion, 
because it is not possible to determine in advance what kind of 
unclarities might arise or be imagined to arise about something. 
Rather, the class of all possible unclarities is open-ended and in this 
sense indeterminable in advance. However, this means that it is 
impossible in principle to say when an analysis, a philosophical 
account or a list of grammatical rules would satisfy the presumed 
abstract criterion of completeness. To satisfy a criterion that is in 
principle indeterminable is an impossible task. 
Instead, Wittgenstein maintains, clarifications, philosophical 
accounts or explanations are to be understood as relative to 
particular problems. A clarification or an explanation is complete 
when it can clarify or explain some set of actual unclarities about an 
issue or a concept, whereby these actual unclarities provide a 
criterion for the completeness of a clarification or explanation. As 
Wittgenstein writes:  
[…] How does one use the expressions ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete 
description’? […] Whether this or that belongs for us to a complete 
description will depend on the purpose of the description, on what the 
recipient uses the description for [was der Empfänger mit der 
Beschreibung anfängt]. (Ts233a, 64-65)  
And:  
[…] One might say: an explanation serves to remove or prevent a 
misunderstanding –– one, that is, that would arise if not for the 
explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine. (PI 
§87) 
Let us return to Baker. If his notion of non-additivity, and his 
rejection of the possibility of achieving comprehensiveness by 
combining different philosophical conceptions are understood in 
the light of what Wittgenstein says about the notion of 
completeness, then Baker’s view does, in a certain sense, point in 
the right direction. Baker is right, insofar as his notion of the non-
additivity of philosophical conceptions is meant to say that, from 
Wittgenstein’s point of view, there cannot be anything like a 
comprehensive philosophical account in an abstract sense, defined 
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independently of particular actual philosophical problems. As 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the abstract notion of the completeness 
of an analysis implies, a clarification must always be understood as 
having specific clarificatory goals. Hence, clarifications, and 
philosophical conceptions presented as clarifications or with the 
purpose of perspicuous representation, are always relative to certain 
actual philosophical problems whose solution provides a criterion 
of correctness and completeness for clarifications. There are many 
Wittgensteinian orderings of our knowledge of the use of language 
in just this sense. There is not merely one such order, the order of 
completed grammar from which we could generate resolutions to 
all philosophical problems, because the totality of all philosophical 
problems is in principle open-ended (see, PI §132 and note 7). 
Nevertheless, as I have explained, the locality of clarifications is 
not to be construed in a too simple way that assumes philosophical 
problems to be neatly separable and identifiable. Rather, as 
Wittgenstein says, philosophical problems come in groups of 
interconnected problems, and are to be addressed as such. This 
may then require the simultaneous clarification of different aspects 
of complicated concepts by means of different conceptions. In this 
sense the task of clarification and perspicuous representation may 
require the combination of different philosophical conceptions into 
more comprehensive multidimensional descriptions. This is 
comprehensiveness in a genuine sense, albeit, crucially, not in the 
sense to which philosophical theories traditionally lay claim. Their 
claim to comprehensiveness arises from a philosophical theory’s 
exclusive claim to account for whatever it is meant to account for, 
which excludes any competing theories as false (see section 1). In 
such circumstances it is then left for the exclusively true theory 
alone to explain everything relevant about the issue at hand in its 
own terms. This is a very different notion of comprehensiveness 
from the Wittgensteinian notion of comprehensiveness, because 
Wittgenstein does not assume that a comprehensive account 
constitutes a simple coherent and systematic unity, as illustrated by 
the examples in section 2. 
A final way to describe Baker’s mistake then is this: His 
rejection of the complementariness and comprehensiveness of 
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philosophical accounts to be achieved by combining different 
Wittgensteinian philosophical conceptions assumes a notion of 
comprehensiveness, or the completeness of philosophical accounts, 
which the later Wittgenstein has already overcome and moved 
beyond. Although Wittgenstein does reject comprehensiveness in 
the traditional sense explained in the preceding, this does not mean 
that he is rejecting comprehensiveness in every sense.19 
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